

Scenari



Report for decision makers

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BORDERS.

LIBYA AND MOLDOVA CASES

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
Borders. Libya and Moldova cases

AMIStaDeS

AMIStaDeS - Fai Amicizia con il Sapere is an independent study center founded in 2017 in Rome and dedicated to the dissemination of international culture.

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At the time of this publication, more than 50 young professionals including management board and analysts are members of AMIStaDeS. All driven by the same thirst for knowledge and sharing.



Scenari

Scenari is a line of reporting aimed at decision-makers of different types, such as companies, institutions, NGOs and other entities operating nationally and internationally. Analysis of the present, combined with awareness and knowledge of the past and the evolution of societies, relationships, and phenomena, allows for the identification of the most likely contextual hypotheses.

Scenarios is a compass to guide decision makers in the actions they decide to take.

Scenari provides perspectives and visions by using the many nuances borrowed from different fields such as social sciences, law, and geopolitics.

Scenari is a spectrum of possibilities among which decision makers can choose.



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INTRODUCTION

by Alessandro Vivaldi

Borders is a series of case studies about the potential pressures (potential or actual ones, present or future ones) on the borders of the European Union, and eventually their potential evolutions. Structured to be useful to different decision makers (from companies as well as from institutions), Borders begins from two specific and present day pressured areas: Libya and Moldova, thus the southern and eastern limits of the EU, both of them widely discussed

in the medias and in the political scenes on national and European levels. As usual, we present a structured report, as a valuable instrument to assess the situation and facilitate the decision making process regarding the southern border, and thus far behind it, the Sub-saharian Africa, and the eastern one, exposed to the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Part I

The southern neighbor: Libya



1.1 The southern neighbor: Libya

by Adele Casale and Valentina Geraci

Abstract

The analysis aims at outlining a clear framework of Italian-Libyan relations with respect to EU's defense of its southern borders, trying to explain how this need is declined according to the respect of Human Rights, pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy driven by the Union itself, and the measures adopted to protect refugees and asylum seekers.

These aspects can be a common ground for cooperation between all Institutions and NGOs involved (despite their glaring internal diversity).

Methodology

In this paperwork on Libya, "Borders" refer to at least three dimensions corresponding to the points of view of at least as many small factions involved:

- 1) the southern borders of the European Union for which Italy plays a key role in externalization, and in geopolitical projection;*
- 2) regional separations with countries bordering Libya where resources are deployed;*
- 3) separation lines of areas of influence within the country, where often, the simplified description of the context sacrifices a coordinated and sustainable long-term strategy.*

Considering

- EU externalization process and protection of its southern borders;*
- the shared jurisdiction on migration and home affairs between the EU and its member states;*
- the role of NGOs in the protection of Human Rights;*

How could it be possible to transform this conflict into a coordination effort involving three related aspects of the same problem i.e., border externalization, shared jurisdiction on migration and economic interests? Is it possible to minimize the negative consequences on those who flee from desperate situations and ought to be protected by appealing to the principle of non-refoulement, and the debate about moving beyond Dublin III?¹ Many actors involved and their related interests are locked in complex contexts: the sources used reflect all the diversified voices present in the Libyan chessboard to offer decision-makers a comprehensive overview of the situation.

¹ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/policies/eu-migration-policy/central-mediterranean-route/>

Context analysis

Libya stretches over 1,759 million km² across North Africa, Maghreb, covering mainly desert territory. It borders Tunisia and Algeria to the west, Niger, Chad and Sudan to the south, Egypt to the east and the Mediterranean Gulf of Sidra to the north. Its population, with an average age of 30 years, exceeds 6 million inhabitants and 78.2% lives in urban areas and the inland nearby.²



The most widespread faith is Islam, namely Sunni Malichite mostly along the coasts, and Ibadi in the surrounding area.

There are four administrative, traditional areas:³

- Tripolitania in the north-west, main city Tripoli. It is linked to Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco for their Berber and

Arabic presence in the mountains and their flat areas located over the coast. Moreover, the area is inhabited by Arabs, mainly nomad Bedouins.

- The well irrigated Cyrenaica (or Barqa area) in the northeast, main city Benghazi. This region is linked to Egypt, which sees it as its extension with its Arab component including nomad

Bedouins.

- The Fezzan consisting of a vast oasis protected from the Sahara Desert and inhabited mainly by Tuareg and Berber nomads confederated

in tribal groups. The area is located in the South west of the country.

- The Jawf in the southeast. A wider territory, but less populated, inhabited mainly by Tebu and Arab tribal groups. It is mostly a desert territory comprising some scattered oasis of different sizes. It hosts even also fresh water wells, such as

² <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/libya-population/>

³ <https://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml>







the important Nubian aquifer, and oil and gas reserves.⁴

- Awsat, a narrow area located between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The port of Sirte overlooking the Gulf of Sidra is the most important spot in the region. The area is culturally, genetically and economically similar to Fezzan, inhabited mainly by Arabs.

Despite historical, genetic and cultural differences, and the presence of clan groups with specific social and economic interests, the population is not fragmented, but foreign stakeholders supporting one party or the other exacerbate internal, existing social and political conflicts.⁵

⁴ Water points often corresponds to human trafficking checkpoints that coincide with the migration route.

⁵ <https://www.amistades.info/post/amistades-intervista-gianfranco-damiano-presidente-della-camera-di-commercio-italo-libica>



- Altri gruppi armati locali
- al-Shabaab
- ISIS/ISIL
- Talebani
- al-Qaeda

Local and regional actors	Reference territories	Resources
The Presidential Council chaired by Mohamed Younis Ahmed al-Manfi has been in office since 15 March 2021. Functions of Head of State headed by the Prime Minister (9 members)	Libya North west, Tripolitania - Tripoli	Support coming from the origin municipalities of its members.
Government of National Agreement. Abdul Hamid Dbaibah, successor of Fayeze al-Sarraj since March 2021 - (executive branch - Tripoli headquarters) -	Libya North west, Tripolitania - Tripoli	Libyan Central Bank
Government of Tobruk. Fathi Ali Abdul Salam Bashagha appointed by General Haftar on 10 February 2022, and installed in Sirte, the general believes that the government of Dbaibah has fallen. Legislative arm made up of Tobruk and al-Bayda authorities legitimized by the 2015 Libyan Political Agreements (LPA)	Central-west Libya, Cyrenaica- Tobruk, aspiring to settle in Tripoli	Oil and gas deposits + mining activity (with considerable waste) managed by the National Oil Company.
Libyan coast guard made up of several groups under the Ministry of Interior or that of Defense + autonomous cells	Northern coasts	EU + Italy funding and training with Africa + Corruption Fund (see Corruption Index)
Libyan municipalities	Administrative municipalities	Law on decentralization issued in 2012, implemented only in 2021 - REBUILD project
Armed groups (al-Watiya, al-Yarmouk, Sidi Bilal)	Territory located between the border with Tunisia and the cities of Misurata and Tripoli	Funded by Turkey
Other Salafist/Deobandi religious political groups (al-Qaeda; al-Shabaab; ISIS/ISIL; Taliban)	Cells scattered mostly over the south, a few cells located in the center, and in the north	Drugs and human being trafficking
Other groups locally rooted	Cells scattered mostly in the south	Various
Migrants + <i>Refugees in Libya</i>	Journey route	Money extorted, not always available

International actors	Reference territories	Resources
European Union	International waters that may partly coincide with SAR areas of different states depending on the mission	Frontex and EU actors involved (non-exhaustive list: the External Service of the Sophia Mission, the European Human Rights Agency)
Italy (VS France on the energy front)	Central and Eastern Area	Memorandum of understanding signed by the then Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and the Head of Government of National Reconciliation of the State of Libya Fayeza Mustapa Serraj, supported by the European Union in 2017 and renewed in February 2020 for three more years
NGOs	Waters of the central Mediterranean	Private and public funds
International Organizations (non-exhaustive list: IOM, UNCHR, WHO, UNICEF)	International waters that may partly coincide with SAR areas of different states depending on the mission	Public funding coming from the Italian government and the EU


Focusing on EU interests and, hence, Italy's, ensuring control over southern shores, as well as borders' fortification of neighboring countries, entrance routes of mercenaries and armed groups favoring human trafficking, became even more urgent and imperative with the outbreak of the Russian conflict in Ukraine. In fact,

European sanctions against Russia force us to turn to the Mediterranean for gas supplies⁶.

⁶ Monitor the gradual resumption of oil and gas production as announced by the National Oil Company on 20 July.

https://www.infomercatiesteri.it/paese.php?id_paesi=109#

Figure 3. Libya's crude oil and condensate exports by destination, 2020



Source: Graph by U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on data from Eurostat, ClipperData, and Global Trade Tracker
 Note: Total crude oil and condensate exports averaged 344,000 barrels per day.

Source: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/LBY>

CORRUPTION INDEX

17/100

score from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (not at all corrupt) according to Transparency International

ENERGY AND OIL EXPORTS

The bank of Tripoli controls these funds and is responsible for disbursement throughout the country, but in the past there were no laws in Libya requiring the bank's transparency to disclose the use of state funds

LYBIAN INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Libya has anti-corruption laws but lax enforcement allows widespread corrupt practices such as embezzlement and bribery in public procurement mainly

COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA

Decision No. 301 of 2021 on the government's Department of Information and Communication poses a real danger to media freedom and independence in

Libya, with very broad powers assigned to an administrative body under the control of the head of government to oversee the media sector, with no regard for international standards on freedom of expression

THE QUESTION OF FIELDS AND FUNDS

Recently state-sanctioned and foreign-funded armed groups profit from irregular flows in various ways:

- - salaries they receive as detention centre guards or simply as members of the state security unit;
- - extorting money from detained migrants in exchange for food or freedom;
- - exploiting forced labour, hiring the services of migrants (typically for cleaning and construction) to the business premises;
- - misappropriation of state funds intended to provide food for detained migrants;
- - misappropriation of funds intended for the renovation of detention facilities

Data processing

The current political process stems from the attempts to overcome the post-election crisis of 2014, which led mainly to two competing claims of legitimacy between the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Government of the National Union (GNA). In 2015, the United Nations guided the involved parties to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) assigning powers and roles, making them co-legislator (see the above table on the actors involved in Libya) to reach political stability for the country. However, this led to the creation of two conflicting governments, preventing elections – initially scheduled for 24 December 2021 with the support of the Libyan Forum for Political Dialogue (LPDF) – from taking place yet. To date, election candidates are Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbaibah, Fathi Ali Abdul Salam Bashagha, Aguila Saleh, Khalifa Haftar and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Elections have been postponed until September 2022 or to 2023. In the meantime, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is trying to promote dialogue between the east and the west, to overcome the political stalemate originated in February 2022, with the appointment of Bashanga by the Tobruk government that believes that Dbaibah mandate – refusing to leave its office – ended in December 2021.


To worsen the situation, in mid-April, oil and gas

production dropped due to the closure of many wells at the urging of internal protests over governmental disputes affecting people's daily life. Following this, on 5 July, Tripoli announced a 25% cut in gas exports to Italy to deal with the domestic shortages exposed by the same popular malcontent. Since 1 July, protests have broken out against the political stalemate involving the two current governments. Their requests has been discussed during three days of meetings held in Geneva until 30 June and supervised by the UN. As announced, the negotiations led to some positive results, but not enough to reach an agreement on the elections, and thus to overcome the political deadlock negatively impacting the management of resources and related services with unsustainable consequences for several reasons, including the rising temperatures of the summer season with regard to electricity supply⁷.

These events affect external stakeholders' interests on energy policies going beyond the management of the migration phenomenon. This was one of the topics of the agenda of the Italian-Libyan summit held on 13 July in Ankara, Turkey. The main issue concerns the fact that Turkey uses migrants moving along the route between Fezzan and Tripolitania as a weapon of blackmail (as it happened between 2015 and 2016 for the Balkan route).

Together with the need to secure EU's southern border, there are human rights concerns of

⁷ GECOL is signing several agreements with external, competing stakeholders.



Medici senza Frontiere <https://msf.org.uk/article/imprisoned-exploited-abused-horrifying-reality-people-trapped-libya>

NGOs.⁸ Since the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding, NGOs have had to change their strategies and management of resources with a negative impact on the direct beneficiaries: migrants, refugees and asylum seekers staying in or attempting to transit through Libya. Libya is not among the signatory countries of the 1948 Human Rights Convention and the 1951 Geneva Convention.

In addition, the funds allocated to local institutional actors resulted in the proliferation of detention centers, some of these are officially recognized, while others are not.⁹ These detention centers are the scene of socio-cultural and political phenomena exacerbated by several local and global dynamics, including the aiding –

or not – of external stakeholders. Italian foreign policy – with the support of the EU – follows the country’s geopolitical and geo-economics projections towards the areas of oil and gas fields where ENI is operating. They all have great humanitarian responsibility by promoting the externalization of their borders in Libya through the following channels:

- Operations led by the UN, the EU, and **Italian military operations** in the central Mediterranean (see Bilateral Assistance and Support Mission in Libya- MIASIT¹⁰, for technical assistance to the Libyan Coast Guard.

⁸ <https://www.ong.it/finanziamenti-alla-guardia-costiera-libica>

⁹ www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/A_HRC_35_25_EN.pdf

¹⁰ https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Libia_Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_e_assistenza/Pagine/default.aspx#:~:text=La%20Missione%20bilaterale%20C3%A8%20intesa,della%20precedente%20Operazione%20E2%80%9CIppocrate%20E2%80%9D

- **The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa).**
- **Support to integrated border and migration management in Libya** (2018-2019)¹¹ and **Cooperation Agreement between the Central Directorate of Immigration and Border Police** headed by the Ministry of the Interior and the Defence Industries Agency AID (2021)¹².
- **Technical agreements between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some International Organizations, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation** (funding for interventions in Libyan detention centers) and the **Ministry of Interior** (agreements with the IOM to support *Assisted Voluntary Return programmes*). The Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI) submitted comments on both points. In the first case with the appeal *Libia: gli interventi finanziati da fondi AICS nei centri*

*di detenzione*¹³; in the second case with an open letter to IOM and UNHCR on the topics "right of asylum" and "crimes against humanity"¹⁴.

- **The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)**, several times accused of involving migrants and asylum seekers in illegal returns¹⁵; definition and organization of people on the move by Frontex;¹⁶ alleged relations between Frontex and the European military and security industry¹⁷ and allegations of circumventing international law.¹⁸ After several allegations and investigations into human rights violations, its Executive Director, Mr Fabrice Leggeri, resigned in 2022, late April/early May.

In this context of foreign and institutional interventions, even local actors and migrants activities are relevant.

It is not easy to negotiate or to make reliable and sustainable agreements over time, as they play in a complex, multilevel socio-political context. Since October 2021, some migrants have

¹¹ https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-second-phase_en

¹² <https://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/25861825c53665b9320450118>

¹³ <https://www.asgi.it/notizie/libia-rapporto-asgi-fondi-aics/>

¹⁴ https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2020_1_Lettera-aperta-ad-Unhcr-e-OIM_def.pdf

¹⁵

<https://euromedmonitor.org/uploads/reports/frontexrep.pdf>


¹⁶ <https://abolishfrontex.org/blog/2021/10/21/frontex-dehumanizing-constitution-of-people-on-the-move/>

¹⁷ <https://abolishfrontex.org/blog/2021/11/22/fact-sheet-frontex-and-the-military-and-security-industry/>

¹⁸ <https://digit.site36.net/2021/10/08/whatsapp-to-libya-how-frontex-uses-a-trick-to-circumvent-international-law/>

mobilized in person and through media channels creating RefugeesinLibya.org.¹⁹ RefugeesinLibya is a non-political party that brings together migrants and asylum seekers collecting daily information, testimonies, and leading appeals to African, European, and international authorities to denounce the gross violations happening with their complicity. Recently, UNHCR Libya responded that "they cannot ensure [refugees and migrants] any kind of security and protection upon their return to their Libyan communities but to work for the re-activation of evacuation flights"²⁰ Flights have effectively resumed to Niger and Rwanda via the

Emergency Transit Mechanism. Moreover, the funding mechanism, which affects economic, political and social dynamics, has led most NGOs to focus on rescues at sea. Hence, how could it be possible to transform this conflict into a balance between the needs of geopolitical and geoeconomic projections on the one hand, and the respect of International Law on the other, minimizing the negative impact on those fleeing desperate situations that should be protected?



¹⁹ www.refugeesinlibya.org

²⁰ https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UFmpnfczx7xiGhJcim_5J4xb4L1pnUP/edit.

The Memorandum is renewed with maintenance of the status quo	
Scenario 1 high probability	<p>In view of the renewal of the Italy-Libya Memorandum, automatically scheduled for February 2023, the Italian authorities will not cancel it by 2 November 2022.</p> <p>Bashaga will continue with his settlement attempts in Tripoli, against Dbaibah's power. Western forces embodied in the UNSMIL, the EU and Italy will accept this political deadlock as a mean to guarantee stability, regardless of the LDF agreement between the two governments, at least until oil, and gas production and export will gradually restart, as announced by the National Oil Company on July 20th.</p> <p>Various associations and NGOs which signed an appeal on 2 February, as well as various petitions (Amnesty case), will continue to present their petitions to the Italian government and International Organizations, seeking the support of Western public opinion, even though Libyan territory remains inaccessible for them. In a long-term scenario, NGOs, in concert with International Organizations to meet funding needs, could present themselves as intermediaries between local institutions supported by foreign stakeholders on the one hand, and popular movements on the other. This is the case of Refugees in Libya. Even with low visibility, all the threats received, they will continue to engage in dialogue with national, African, and international institutions, and will constitute an important source of information. Support for the movement and its visibility by institutions and international organizations will be directly proportional to the interest of Western public opinion. Given that in the last five years, NGOs have not been included in the management of the Libya dossier issues, the above-mentioned movement will be an opportunity for them to act, at least offering representative support from afar.</p> <p>Even considering the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum, Western institutions involved will aim at containing the migration phenomenon in the post-pandemic context, especially since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine. The rationale is to keep the number of asylum seekers low, hindering the flow through policies of externalization.</p> <p>Therefore, Italy and the EU (with the co-responsibility of several bodies), will continue to deploy funds to the Libyan Coast Guard, both obtaining raw materials in return (oil and ENI case). Italian and European foreign policy actions, therefore, will continue to be oriented towards economic benefits, adopting with a security and purely institutional approach. In all likelihood, the socio-political complexity will continue to be streamlined at the expense of a more constructive dialogue with a Libya that is indeed a 'stable neighbor'.</p>
NGOs will deploy resources for a local bottom-up approach, although they do not have direct access to the territory	
Scenario 2 Medium-low probability	<p>Despite conflicting voices, the Italy-Libya Memorandum will be renewed in November 2022 with the support of the EU. Elections will take place soon, Dbaibah will remain head of the government in Tripoli amid protests from the Tobruk-Sirte faction, and its supporting parties, who will appeal to the LDF roadmap that would prevent his re-election. UNSMIL – committed to promote dialogue between the parties – will continue to let events take their course by intervening in support of a stabilization. The goal is overcoming the political stalemate, regardless of the conditions that will emerge, and pursuing a strategy of securing the borders both at the EU-Maghreb level and at the regional and local levels, where the complexity of the socio-political dynamics is reflected in temporary or long-lasting diatribes of varying degrees. However, Libya is not going towards a civil war.</p> <p>Due to this strategy merely oriented towards security, funds will continue to be deployed adopting an emergency approach to the detriment of a sound, sustainable, inclusive, forward-looking, strategic neighborhood policy of all stakeholders involved.</p> <p>This approach will continue to affect the activities of NGOs whose operations will continue to be mostly relegated to the emergency aspects of the migration phenomenon. Their resources, therefore, will follow the security flow, leaving aside social support to make room for bureaucratic support, especially for voluntary repatriation. Likewise, International Organizations will depend on compromises dictated by current strategies, and their actions will continue to lack effectiveness in terms of guaranteeing and protecting the rights and safety of migrants and refugees.</p> <p>Finally, securing borders will unlikely guarantee control over the porous borders between Libya and its neighboring countries, especially those to the south such as Niger and Chad, located in a mostly desert territory. The economic interests of small local groups exacerbate the borders' porosity. This will lead to an increasingly monothematic allocation of funds, which will have two main effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The containment of the migratory phenomenon within Libya's borders without any real management of the problem, left exclusively in the hands of local authorities – whether formal or informal – who will use their power to perpetuate their specific interests and illicit activities. • Exasperating socio-political diversity between different actors and interests. <p>NGOs will continue to be excluded from direct interventions, unless they try to adopt a bottom-up approach (probably not possible neither in the short nor in the long term due to the scarce resources available), supporting non-politically aligned movements such as Refugees in Libya. In this perspective, it is crucial to deploy ad hoc resources, and have specific knowledge of the territory and its political, economic, socio cultural mechanisms. Furthermore, Human Rights must be conceived with a critical intercultural approach.</p>

	<p align="center">The Memorandum is not renewed, and socio-political specificity taken into consideration with a consequent green light for local NGO intervention</p>
<p align="center">Scenario 3 Very low probability</p>	<p>Despite internal unrest, mostly localized, and despite external stakeholders support to very few of the factions involved, mainly for economic interests, it is unlikely that the Libyan chessboard will become a second Syria, both over the short and long run. Moreover, the ethnic-cultural diversity, forming defined areas linked to their neighboring countries in a territory that is largely inaccessible, as it is desert, is not among the main causes of internal diatribes.</p> <p>It is unlikely that steps will be taken to reflect the local specificity of the various instances, mostly due to inaccessibility. In fact, on the one hand, latest events show the struggle in bringing local parties to the negotiating table, and above all, in signing agreements with them that are respected in the long term, on the other hand territorial and political inaccessibility remains the main problem for NGOs.</p> <p>Therefore, they struggle to build a dense network with specific local entities, where municipalities and the new RefugeesinLibya movement play important roles.</p> <p>Institutions and International Organizations will not act due to the presence of multiple local actors, and they will not renounce to a dichotomous narrative, focusing on the two governmental macro factions to ensure stability in the country and subsequently exploit energy resources. With these assumptions, there is little chance that Presidents Dbaiyah and Bashaga will agree to elections as early as the beginning of 2023, as UNSMIL, the EU and Italy hope. Finally, it is unlikely that new candidates will fill the posts.</p> <p>Despite a more stable context, it is still very unlikely that migrant smuggling will stop. It will continue to take place as an effect of security funding policies, following peaks of indignation by Western public opinion.</p> <p>Indeed, it is unlikely that the migratory issue will be addressed outside the framework of the Italy-Libya Memorandum. At least until the memorandum will remain in its current form and the Dublin III system is in place, the focus will be trying to limit the phenomenon with the complicity of neighboring countries. Finally, local autonomy and political immobility are somewhat both consequences of the simplification carried out by Western narrative. The same interpretation will also have the effect of worsening the conditions of detention centers, and a proliferation of informal ones.</p>

Part II

Moldovan trilemma



2.1 Moldova's Security Trilemma in the framework of the Ukrainian conflict. The synergies between Organized Crime and a Transitioning Military Context at the gates of Europe

by Alessio Briguglio e Alessandro Vitiello

Abstract

Starting from the military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, adopting an interdisciplinary methodological approach to border studies, this paper aims at analyzing critical and topical issues concerning neighboring scenarios, directly involved, and equally affected by the uncertainties of the territorial transition. The Republic of Moldova perfectly falls into this category, it is indeed one of the countries most affected by the uncertainty linked to regional security and its own internal structure. First, what data explain the distribution of regional power? Then, how can the opposing influences in the region of Russia and the European Union find a structure? What is the impact of the synergies between a transitioning context and organized crime? Hence, what are the alternatives to this trilemma? A regard on these issues is clearly influenced by the interdisciplinary nature of border studies. The methodology adopted lies the ground for understanding the link between conflict and territory, studying the alternatives to this trilemma, and finally, processing the results concerning the research impact on the regional military context. Analyzing the Moldovan context, research results show that organized crime influences the mechanism of accentuation/reduction of the propensity to social and territorial tensions, which in turn – passing from the dynamics of parliamentary power – affects the permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova, hence the regulation of the trilemma. Moldova is therefore a border country that risks being affected on multiple fronts by the trilemma on its national security and territorial vulnerability (comprising even the militarization and exclavization of Transnistria) to overcome the transition from a territory-based system to an identity-based (federal or national) system.

Methodological approach

The essential prerequisite of the entire research work is the definition of a precise methodological framework. The method used is empirical: the research follows a logical-deductive order to process data and reach the results. First, the causal link between the dependent variable (conflict) and the independent variable (aspects of territoriality) is established; the logic of the influence of organized crime is also defined. The following step was the observation of transversal data (i.e. a specific timeframe), and their logic systematization, drawing mainly from four well-known databases: the databases of «The Correlates of War» Project (COW)²¹, mainly the «MID»²², the «NMC»²³, the «Territorial Change» databases; the database «Stockholm International Peace Research Institute» (SIPRI)²⁴, and more specifically the «SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database», and the «SIPRI Arms Transfers Database»; the

²¹ COW Official Website:
<http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets>

²² Militarized Interstate Disputes

²³ National Material Capacities

²⁴ SIPRI Official Website:
<https://www.sipri.org/databases>

«Uppsala Conflict Data Program» (UCDP)²⁵; and finally, «The Issue Correlates of War» Project (ICOW)²⁶. In this sense, the tables provide a significant aid in the collection of data and their conceptual reorganization. Finally, deductions (i.e., data processing and scenarios) are a deductive consequence of this process.

Context analysis

a) Raffestin and the cyclical nature of borders

This study, although part of the field of border studies (known for their interdisciplinarity), draws inspiration mainly from the works of C. Raffestin. In his critical work, he argues that an actor must «recognize himself through space»²⁷, conceiving then a cyclic process called TDR²⁸: a process of power redistribution around a new center, where one actor territorializes, the other de-territorializes (abandonment or de-codification of the territory). Borders, mainly those within Europe, are therefore the most exposed to this process.

b) The causal link between territoriality and conflict, or the scientific basis of the Moldovan trilemma of security

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the Moldovan context, unlike other regions (such as the Baltics), cannot be studied through the traditional model of regional power distribution,²⁹ due to the lack of features belonging to this scheme. Although this complicates the study, it shows the centrality of

the security trilemma (and its chances of resolution): in addition to shifting the analysis on a dynamic of internal power (i.e., the parliamentary dynamic) having external implications, it is the key to understanding the main feature of this region: transitoriness. More precisely, the regulation of the trilemma resides in permanent neutrality: at one extreme, the maintenance of the current permanent neutrality, or at the other extreme joining NATO and the European Union.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union – on July 29th 1994 – to gain stability and sovereignty over its territory, as well as nourish the hope of a plausible withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory, the then newly independent Republic of Moldova enshrined permanent neutrality in its constitution (Article 11).³⁰ As Moldovan scholar Marandici states, permanent neutrality encompasses the strategy «to survive between two stronger neighbors [...] and as a response to Russia's pressure to include Moldova in various security projects»³¹: It is the country's instrument

²⁵ UCDP Official Website:

http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/

²⁶ ICOW Official Website:

<http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html>

²⁷ Raffestin, 1981, p.29

²⁸ Territorialization – Deterritorialization – Reterritorialization

²⁹ Model with three distinct categories: military capabilities (air, naval and land forces), ballistic capabilities (AD/A2) and intervention capabilities

³⁰ Pintea, Helly, Panainte, 2011, p.29

³¹ Marandici, 2007, p.1

to maintain its sovereignty and independence from Russia and Romania.

Nevertheless, there are two elements that clearly conflict with the 1994 declaration: the Russian military presence in Transnistria (officially part of the Moldovan state), and the Moldovan policy of rapprochement with the European Union and NATO (the country cooperates only with the Alliance). The trilemma therefore shows – despite some intrinsic contradictions – the uncertainty of safety in the region, increasing indeed the possibility of calculation errors, that generally are more under control in a traditional scheme.

Besides its central role at national level, neutrality is the guarantee for Russia that a post-Soviet Republic will not join NATO in the future:³² Russian interests in the region push for the strict maintenance of Moldova's neutrality and the firm opposition to its NATO membership.

Now, let's assume that the driving force of the regulation of the security trilemma lies in the accentuation or reduction of the propensity to social and territorial tension, i.e., the mechanism that explains the impact of conflicts on territoriality. In other terms, the various aspects of territoriality (listed in the table below) influence the position of the parliamentary forces, which in turn influences the position of Moldova on security issues related to the trilemma.

Let's assume even that this mechanism (the propensity to tension) is in turn influenced by the logics of organized crime (it is therefore indirectly impacting on Moldova's neutrality and security). Drawing from the databases listed above, it is possible to build the following table, to set the basis of the trilemma and the subsequent analyses:

³² Socor, 2006, p.4-6

Logic of influence of organized crime on the aspects of territoriality	Aspects of territoriality	Increased tension propensity, if:	Reduced tension propensity, if:
n.a.	Contiguity	Existing	Inexistent
Orienting the strategic value towards economic aspects	Strategic importance	Strategic	Not Strategic
n.a.	Territorial dispute	Existing	Inexistent
Strengthening of the Moldovan-Russian dyad	Dyad	Historically antagonist	Historically allied
Identity territorialization	National identity	Existing bond	Non-existent bond
Regional Power Distribution	Regional Power Distribution	Power imbalance	Balance of power
Politicization	Economic interdependence	Low	High
n.a.	Industrial divide	Pronounced	Marginal
n.a.	Technological divide	Pronounced	Marginal
Cover-up	Agreements and diplomatic commitments	Negotiated and/or signed	Missing
Ghettoization	Ethnic fragmentation	Pronounced	Irrelevant
Development of a counterculture	Inter-ethnic relations	Unbalanced	Equal

Table 1 - Some of the basic elements of the propensity to social and territorial tension

Source: authors' elaboration (Vitiello, Briguglio)

The list above can be enriched drawing from the works of some authors. In fact, the data collected from the «COW» Project allows Mr. Huth³³ to outline five key assumptions. The marginal industrial gap, trade and the existence of international legal agreements limit territorial tensions. Conversely, territorial disputes, strategic importance, the historical antagonism

of a Diade (relationship between two States) are a precursor to territorial tensions. Analyzing data of the Project «ICOW», Hensel and Mitchell noted a positive correlation between territorial disputes (river, sea, land) and the militarized conflict.³⁴ Senese and Vasquez highlighted that contiguity, more than non-contiguity,

³³ Huth, 1996 p.19-22

³⁴ Hensel, Mitchell

accentuates the propensity to territorial tension and, more generally, to conflict.³⁵

c) *The influence of organized crime*

It is vital to dwell on a subject that is often omitted from the discussion on the Moldovan conflict: organized crime has a significant influence on the security trilemma. It is important to take into consideration the – unquantifiable – logics behind it influencing the «basic» aspects of territoriality, in turn linked to conflict due to the propensity to social and territorial tension. Above all, it is very useful to understand the strong cultural link between part of the Moldovan society and the Russian one. In particular, the Transnistria area is one of the main channels connecting the Eurozone, Russia, and the Balkans for the trafficking of weapons, drugs, and human beings. A fertile ground for the development of all kinds of black-market activities, **thanks to the rampant corruption of the government and its institutions. Moldova, considering its unique transitory condition, ranks 105th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perception Index.**³⁶

Just like other local factors analyzed so far, the analysis of organized crime in Moldova strictly depends on the Soviet Union or, at least, on the aftermath of its fall. In this regard, the political shock caused by the intensification of the clashes

in Ukraine are a golden opportunity for Moldovan organized crime, closely connected to the Russian one.³⁷ However, it is at least jarring how criminal contexts inherently deviant prove themselves rather close to the government management in this context, especially to modern Russia. This fully represent a strengthening of the Moldovan-Russian dyad.

From an economic and political point of view, the area indeed depends on Russia, which ensures its survival providing large quantities of natural gas. Suffice it to say that in 2004, Transnistria owed two thirds of its debt to energy giant Gazprom. Militarily, the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria also relies on the support of the 14th ex-Soviet Army, present on the territory with about 2,500-3,000 units. Led at the time of the civil war of secession by General Lebed, now formally under the control of the Russian Federation.

There is also strong collusion between public authorities and the local mafia³⁸, formed by members of the Solncevo Brigade of Russian origin. The latter have direct relations with several transnational terrorist organizations, mainly of Islamic fundamentalist origin.

It is clear how the structure of Transnistria institutions is stuck in the 90s, same goes for the criminalistic logics behind the activities of organized crime in the area. Transnistria is

³⁵ Senese, Vasquez, 2008, p.334

³⁶ www.transparency.org

³⁷ Galeotti, M., 'How the Invasion of Ukraine is Shaking Up the Global Crime Scene', Vice.com, 6 November 2014, <http://www.vice.com/read/how-the-invasion->

[of-ukraine-is-shaking-up-the-global-crime-scene-1106](#), accessed 18 November 2014.

³⁸ Madeo, C. "Transnistria: lo Stato criminale", *Stampo Antimafioso*, 16 September 2014, [Transnistria: lo Stato criminale - Stampo Antimafioso](#)

officially part of Moldova, although it unilaterally declared its independence on September 2, 1990. From March to July 1992, the region was hit by a war that ended with a ceasefire. Nevertheless, since then, Moldovan central government has not gained back territorial sovereignty over the left bank of the Dnestr yet.

The ideological foundations of Transnistrian independence are constantly being questioned. This has meant – along with the historical reasons mentioned so far – that the criminal imagination of local organizations has its roots in Russian history rather than Moldovan or European history. An endemic reaction to the established power.

Indeed, the criminal embryo, "Vory v zakone," or "thieves in law" – nowadays almost disappeared – grew in Soviet prison camps; it is the common ancestor of contemporary mafia clans that blossomed in the post-Soviet era. A criminality linked to prison shrouded in a controversial charm, that was constantly invoked both by popular and criminal culture. "Thieves", because being able to steal, being skillful with their hands, cheating using magic tricks and in card games, were activities considered a form of art that deserved reverence, honor, and respect.³⁹ It is clear, therefore, how the collapse of the Soviet Union was a curious turning point for the role of the vor within the Russian criminal hierarchy becoming a real leader in a deviant context in search of – like

political institutions – new balances. Similarly, the increase in poverty and backwardness of Russia in the 1990s led the criminal imagination to cannibalize Soviet images and messages. Nothing strange, in a purely Marxist perspective, where the dominant force takes a position, the deviant minority will tend to assume a specular one. A relationship of "love and hate" between totalitarianism and organized crime that represents a further point of contact with the Italian criminal history. Despite the fierce repression put in place during the twenty-year fascist towards banditry and southern organized crime, thanks to the support given to the allies for the landing in Sicily during the operation Husky, the Mafia political vision gradually became more and more "Anti-communist", embracing and further distorting the typically fascist "God-fatherland-family" triad of values. However, the criminal subculture of Moldova and especially of Transnistria traces its origins back not only to the dark tsarist prisons and later to the Soviet prisons but also to historical facts completely unrelated to the criminal and deviant sphere proving once again its strong territoriality and local identity. The populations of Mongolian origins, coming mainly from the Siberian territory, were victims of a real racial segregation committed by the Soviet government that built neighborhoods, or rather ghettos, intended for these minorities. It is easy to understand how this ethnic segregation, perpetrated by the

³⁹ A. NORCIA, *Carte da gioco e tatuaggi: il codice segreto nelle prigioni sovietiche*, in «Vice», 13-XI-2018.

current authority, led to the development of a counterculture that dusted off the ancient pre-Christian tradition using it as a tool of cultural resistance and armed contestation against Christian institutions and later atheist ones. A well-known example of this visceral attachment to tradition is another typical costume of Russian folklore, widely described by genre literature and cinematography as peculiar to local mafia: the culture of baths and sauna. Already practiced by the peoples of continental Russia in pre-Christian times it became more than a merely hygienic practice: for the peoples of the northern steppes the sauna became a real spiritual tradition widespread among all ethnic groups inhabiting the current Russian territory. The concept of baths as a free zone where people get to know each other through their tattoos feeds on ancient traditions and, as usual, ancestral ones.⁴⁰ When the ancient inhabitants of the steppe fall ill, they believed that evil spirits were the cause of their suffering. To remove these dark presences from the villages and protect themselves from the evil eye of witches and sorcerers, they followed different rituals at hot water sources and inside the first rudimentary examples of artificial saunas.

The whole life of the tribes was marked by an eternal war against evil spirits and – as in any culture – this war was fought in places that were the territories of the forces of good and areas that were under the undisputed control of evil.

In the culture of the people inhabiting these areas the light dominated over the places source of livelihoods like the clear waters of lakes and rivers rich in fish or the woods crossed by hunters in search of live meat. Evil, on the other hand, tyrannized the treacherous swamps, the raging volcanic areas and the most dangerous waterways. In this natural Manichean opposition, the sauna became the sacred ground where men and spirits could coexist and negotiate. In fact, shamans of the ancient tribes settled in current Siberia considered environmental humidity as a balm with magical properties able to resist on everything even on the body of men leading them in the realm of spirits.

The tradition of criminal symbology both in moral codes and in people's behavior as well as in the symbology of tattooing has gradually become rare. However, the cultural and financial proximity to Russia remains, with which it trades on the black market, in the case of goods and services prohibited, as a real parastatal plant.

d) The delicate parliamentary balance

Moldovan Parliament consists of 101 seats, distributed – after the 2021 elections – among four parties. While 2014 elections saw the success of the new PSRM (the Socialist Party), and the formation of two coalitions within the Moldovan parliament, one pro-Russian and one pro-European, the latest parliamentary elections that took place on 11 July 2021 undermined the

⁴⁰ Russiana Criminal Tattoo Encyclopedia Volume I, introduction of ALEXEIPLUTSER-SARNO.

coalition formed by pro-Russian parties and saw the victory of the «PAS», which became the largest political force, holding more than half of the seats in the Chişinău Parliament. As shown in the table, the Parliament is divided on the issue of security and neutrality. This has consequences on the future structure of the country and on the degree of Russia's hostility in the Moldovan context.

Out of the four parties, three (i.e., the pro-Russian parliamentary coalition formed by the socialist and the communist parties together with the Sor Party) – despite being opposition parties – support the maintaining of permanent neutrality. Indeed, the PSRM has always underlined that «neutrality is enshrined in the Constitution», and the PCRM that it «will strengthen the principle of constitutional neutrality». The coalition also stresses that «constitutional neutrality must be consolidated in further legislative acts».

Security issues therefore isolate the only pro-European force in the Moldovan Parliament, i.e., the force currently holding the power presided by Prime Minister Maia Sandu.

While prior to the 2021 elections, the Democratic Party (PDM) ensured the balance on security issues between the two coalitions, being part of the pro-European coalition but firmly advocating neutrality, this balance has entered into crisis since the elections of 2021. In other words, before 2021, the parliamentary majority was in favor of neutrality; from 2021, credibility on the issue of neutrality is in

jeopardy, due to the pro-European and Atlanticist dialogue of the «PAS».

Moreover, the ruling party – openly liberal – absorbed those voters supporting pro-European parties that conceived NATO as an essential step towards European integration. These parties are the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Liberal Party (PL) (22.7% and 12.8% respectively of votes during November 2014 elections). Although these parties do not hold seats in the Parliament, the «PAS» clearly owes its position of power to the absorption of their electoral component. Already opposition parties, they intended «to guarantee a higher level of security for the Republic of Moldova, based on closer cooperation in the security zone with the West».

After the elections of July 2021, Moldovan politics is therefore for the first time oriented towards the pro-Western alternative of its security trilemma. This is not only made clear by the exit of the PDM from the Parliament and the loss of its political role as a hurdle for the pro-European coalition tilting so far the balance towards the maintenance of permanent neutrality, but also with the more centralizing and liberal vocation of the «PAS», amplified by the war in neighboring Ukraine.

Of course, Moldova's interest in NATO is less relevant than its interest in the EU integration process, - this year Moldova officially received EU candidate status. However, the merely liberal component, distinct from other forces traditionally pro-European (such as the PDM)

but neutralist, embodies a distinct – and more subversive – perception of its orientation on the issue of permanent neutrality. Indeed, it is

unlikely that a pro-Russian orientation, or a more neutralist orientation, could lead to the official candidacy to the European Union.

*Table 2 – The Trilemma of Moldovan Security and the Parliamentary Map of the Republic of Moldova, illustrating last elections (July 2021)
Source: Author's Elaboration (Vitiello)*

I. The Trilemma of Moldovan Security				
Alternative 1	Maintenance of neutrality			
Alternative 2	Neutrality supported by NATO and Russia			
Alternative 3	Joining NATO			
II. Parliamentary map				
Parties	Position in the security trilemma	%	Seats	Coalitions
Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS)	Alternative 3	52,80	63	-
Communist Party (PCRM)	Alternatives 1 and 2	27,17	32	Pro-Russian Coalition (Communist and Socialist Bloc PCRM - PSRM)
Socialist Party (PSRM)	Alternatives 1 and 2			
Şor Party	Alternatives 1 and 2	5,74	6	-

Data processing

The scenarios – or the alternatives to the trilemma – that the country could face will all have a strong impact on the future of Moldova, as well as on Russia’s foreign policy.

	Neutrality supported by NATO and Russia
Scenario 1 High probability	<p>Both the Russian Federation and the Atlantic Alliance support the maintenance of Moldova’s neutrality. In this scenario, Russia would be able to physically reconnect Transnistria to its territory, without the secession producing an «exclavization» (scenario 2).</p> <p>In this scenario, political stability would be jeopardized, and the government would be more delegitimized, since permanent neutrality would be a Russia-American compromise solution, regardless of the position of the Moldovan parliament – and the government.</p> <p>The Republic of Moldova would therefore lose its territorial integrity due to the definitive secession of Transnistria, while maintaining its permanent neutrality as a prerequisite of compromise not to fuel Russian antagonism, leaving the country in an undefined state.</p> <p>National security of the Republic of Moldova would also be guaranteed by permanent neutrality and would no longer be as unstable as in the past, due to the loss of the role of Transnistria as a vector of Russian influence in Moldova.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the region beyond the Nistru river, incorporated within the Russian borders, would increasingly be a military bastion, leading to a growing militarization of the border.</p> <p>Moreover, this process would imply a transition from a limited border vulnerability to a persistent status of border vulnerability.</p> <p>Lastly, the government structure of the Republic of Moldova would move towards the constitution of a national state. In this scenario, however, the legitimacy of a Moldovan identity rather than a Romanian one (also known as «moldovenization» of national identity) would increase, therefore the hypothesis of the reunification of Bessarabia to (Great) Romania would fade, delegitimizing the formation of unionist political movements.</p> <p>Territorial integrity: Loss of territorial integrity</p> <p>National security: Uncertain</p> <p>Military position of Transnistria: Militarization</p> <p>Russian antagonism: Indefinite</p> <p>Vulnerability: Persistent</p> <p>Parties stability: In Crisis</p> <p>Possible State structure: National state, based on Moldovan identity; unionism less likely</p>

	NATO membership
Scenario 2 Average probability - high	<p>The Republic of Moldova is moving towards the prospect of a future European integration and joining the Atlantic Alliance. In this scenario Russia increases its level of hostility the most.</p> <p>First, this would imply the loss of Moldovan territorial integrity: the Transnistrian Secessionist Republic would no longer be reintegrated into a national state structure protecting even less the Russian-speakers of the region. This would transform them into an ethno-linguistic minority in a national state that – moving towards Europeanism and Atlantism – abandoned federalism, a vehicle of Russian influence.</p> <p>The establishment of a national state, in turn, implies the possibility of a broad rapprochement with (Great) Romania (statehood of Romanians), due to a more widespread and sound unionism, especially among pro-European forces.</p> <p>NATO membership would result in a major reorganization of national security, as was the case for the three Baltic States in 2004. If the country joins NATO, Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact would ensure national security more than the current permanent neutrality.</p> <p>The boost in national security increases confrontation with Russia: Transnistria would likely become a highly militarized exclave of strategic importance, same as Kaliningrad.</p> <p>Exclavization and militarization of Transnistria would increase vulnerability along the already widely vulnerable Moldovan borders: more security also means more vulnerability. Moreover, the case of the Baltics shows that regional power is heavily tilted towards of Russia: although NATO manages to reassure its allies, which witnessed an increase in their border vulnerability, it does not match Russia’s capabilities in any field.</p> <p>Lastly, in this scenario the party «PAS» and Prime Minister Maia Sandu would emerge strengthened having been able to guide Moldova out of the traditional role of satellite country of Russia, and having laid the foundations for the official candidacy to the European Union and a rapprochement with Romania. However, this power would at least be reduced by the loss of territorial integrity.</p> <p>Territorial integrity: Loss of territorial integrity</p> <p>National Security: Ensured by Article 5</p> <p>Military position of Transnistria: Exclavization and militarization</p> <p>Vulnerability: Amplified</p> <p>Russian Antagonism: Defined by Alliance Membership (Comparison)</p> <p>Parties stability: Stable</p> <p>Possible State structure: Unionist Nation State</p>

	Maintaining neutrality
Scenario 3 Low probability	<p>First, the Russian Federation insists on maintaining Moldova’s permanent neutrality: remaining neutral, Moldova can remain under the Russian sphere of influence. Russia, therefore, would not accept that the post-Soviet Republic joined the European and Atlantic institutions in the future without increasing its level of hostility towards the country. In this scenario of permanent neutrality, the country will maintain its territorial integrity: Transnistria could potentially be reintegrated into the political and governmental system of the future government structure of Moldova. The latter, indeed, will be a federal state and not a national state: this will allow Russian speakers inhabiting Transnistria to exercise greater power in national decision-making processes, confirming the role of the region as a vehicle for Russian influence in the Moldovan context.</p> <p>National security is uncertain: even after the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the seizure of Crimea by the Russian Federation, Moldovan territory felt under aggression. However, at least so far Russia has never recognized Transnistria independence or its annexation to the Russian Federation, even though the government of Tiraspol in the past sent the Duma its request for admission to the Russian Federation.⁴¹ This could mean that should the Republic of Moldova become neutral, Transnistria could be reintegrated into its own state system.</p> <p>Neutrality is the only alternative that could favor a possible withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Transnistria. Nevertheless, the current Russian military presence in Moldovan territory (in Transnistria) is in contradiction with Russia’s commitment to respecting permanent neutrality. This contradiction shows that the Russian Federation is more concerned about the guarantees of non-admission to NATO than it is willing to concretely commit to withdrawing its forces. The uncertainty looming over the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria sparked in some political parties greater interest in NATO, which is why, at least until 2022, over time there has been a slight decrease in Russian contingent (reaching about 2,000 in 2006 and about 1500 in 2019).⁴²</p> <p>This implies, however, that Russia’s antagonism towards Moldova is not clearly defined: Russia expresses a floating degree of hostility through the various crises and wars, leading the country to increase or decrease its antagonism without any linearity.</p> <p>Finally, border vulnerability – while remaining very high – is limited by the status of permanent neutrality: a more dubious security and greater antagonism equals lesser vulnerable borders.</p> <p>Constitutional guarantees can, in the order of coherence and rationality, prevent Transnistria from becoming a repetition of what happened in Crimea, or what is happening in Donbass and other regions invaded by Russia. Finally, in this scenario, parliamentary majority would enter a crisis, having failed in its attempt to set Moldova on a path of political and military separation from its traditional role as a Russian satellite.</p> <p>Territorial integrity Maintenance of territorial integrity National security Uncertain Military position of Transnistria Possible withdrawal of Russian forces Russian Antagonism Limited by Article 11 of the Moldovan Constitution Vulnerability Limited Parties stability In Crisis Possible State structure Federal State</p>

⁴¹ Albu, 2016, p.160

⁴² Source: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

Source classification

Affidabilità della fonte		
A	Affidabile	Nessun dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; ha una storia di completa affidabilità.
B	Normalmente affidabile	Piccoli dubbi di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; ha una storia di informazioni valide nella maggior parte dei casi
C	Abbastanza affidabile	Dubbio di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza, tuttavia in passato ha fornito informazioni valide
D	Normalmente non affidabile	Dubbio significativo sull'autenticità, affidabilità o competenza, tuttavia in passato ha fornito informazioni valide
E	Inaffidabile	Mancanza di autenticità, affidabilità o competenza; storia di informazioni non valide
F	Non giudicabile	Non esiste alcuna base per valutare l'affidabilità della fonte

Contenuto dell'informazione		
1	Confermata	Confermato da altre fonti indipendenti; logico in sé; coerente con altre informazioni sull'argomento
2	Presumibilmente vera	Non confermato ; logico in sé; coerente con altre informazioni sull'argomento
3	Forse vera	Non confermato ; ragionevolmente logico in sé; concorda con alcune altre informazioni sull'argomento
4	Incerta	Non confermato ; possibile ma non logico ; non ci sono altre informazioni sull'argomento
5	Improbabile	Non confermato ; non logico in sé ; contradetto da altre informazioni sull'argomento
6	Non giudicabile	Non esiste alcuna base per valutare la validità dell'informazione

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The southern neighbor: Libya

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